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OPINION 
________________ 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Briaheen Thomas appeals from the District Court’s 
order granting summary judgment to Deputy Superintendent 
Eric Tice, Deputy Mark Garman, Correction Classification and 
Program Manager Timothy Miller, and Major Heather 
Halderman. For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm in 
part and reverse in part the District Court’s order. 
 
I 
 
At all relevant times for this appeal, Thomas was an 
inmate at SCI-Rockview, in the custody of the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections. On May 31, 2015, Thomas 
received a friend in the prison’s visiting room. As they visited, 
Thomas’s friend handed him a bag of peanut M&Ms. He ate 
one and then quickly took a drink of soda. One of the guards, 
believing that Thomas had ingested contraband, immediately 
handcuffed him and removed him from the visiting room. 
Thomas was then placed in a dry cell in the prison’s infirmary. 
 
A “dry cell” is a cell that lacks water—all standing 
water has been drained from the toilet, the room’s water supply 
has been shut off, and the sink and toilet have been capped to 
prevent inmate access. An inmate may be placed in a dry cell 
when prison staff have observed the inmate attempt to ingest 
an item of contraband or they learn that the inmate is 
attempting to introduce contraband into the prison. Dry cells 
are used to closely observe the inmate until natural processes 
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allow for the ingested contraband to be retrieved. To this end, 
dry cells lack all linens and moveable items other than a 
mattress, inmates’ clothes are exchanged for a simple smock, 
and their movements are carefully controlled to prevent them 
from concealing or disposing of any retrievable contraband.  
 
To expedite his release from the dry cell, Thomas was 
offered laxatives, which he accepted. Over the next four days, 
Thomas had twelve bowel movements. No evidence of any 
contraband was found in any of Thomas’s bowel movements. 
Prison staff also x-rayed Thomas on June 1. The x-ray revealed 
no contraband. 
 
Only the prison’s Program Review Committee 
(“PRC”)1 and facility manager2 are authorized to determine 
when to release an inmate from administrative confinement, 
including from a dry cell. DC-ADM 802 § 4.A. And 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections policies require the 
PRC to review an inmate’s administrative placement during 
the first seven days of confinement and determine whether that 
placement should continue. DC-ADM 802 § 2.A. On June 4, 
2015—day four of Thomas’s confinement in the dry cell—the 
PRC interviewed him at the dry cell.  
 
Following its interview with Thomas, the PRC decided 
to continue Thomas’s confinement in the dry cell for five more 
days, releasing him on June 9, 2015. Later, Thomas filed an 
administrative grievance against prison officials, which was 
ultimately upheld in part and denied in part on administrative 
appeal. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Thomas 
filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the members of 
the PRC had violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free 
from cruel and unusual punishment. Following discovery, the 
PRC moved for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge, 
finding disputed issues of material fact, recommended that the 
motion be denied. Thomas v. Tice, No. 4:16-CV-01487, 2018 
WL 1278586 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2018). But the District Court 
                                              
1 The appellees in this case were the members of the 
PRC. We sometimes refer to them collectively as the PRC. 
 
2 Deputy Garman was both a member of the PRC and 
the facility manager at SCI-Rockview. J.A. 314. 
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rejected the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation 
and granted the motion for summary judgment. Thomas v. 
Tice, No. 4:16-CV-01487, 2018 WL 1251831 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 
12, 2018). Thomas timely appealed from the District Court’s 
order.  
 
II 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Thomas’s civil 
rights action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal from the District Court’s final 
order granting summary judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
“We exercise plenary review over the grant or denial of 
summary judgment and apply the same standard the district 
court should have applied.” Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 
895 F.3d 303, 309 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Summary 
judgment is appropriate when, drawing all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, “the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact,” and 
thus the movant “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 
2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “A dispute is genuine if 
a reasonable trier-of-fact could find in favor of the non-
movant” and “material if it could affect the outcome of the 
case.” Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 
294, 300 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 
U.S. 242, 248, 252 (1986)). “We deny summary judgment if 
there is enough evidence for a jury to reasonably find” for the 
nonmoving party. Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 309 (citation omitted). 
 
III 
 
Thomas brought his civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that 
a person (or persons), acting under color of law, deprived him 
of a constitutional right. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 
(1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 
474 U.S. 327 (1986). Thomas alleged that the conditions of his 
confinement in the dry cell violated his Eighth Amendment 
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The parties 
do not dispute that the PRC acted under color of law, but they 
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do dispute whether Thomas’s Eighth Amendment rights were 
violated. 
 
The Eighth Amendment “prohibits any punishment 
which violates civilized standards and concepts of humanity 
and decency.” Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 
1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in 
Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations 
omitted). To prevail against prison officials on a claim that an 
inmate’s conditions of confinement violated the Eighth 
Amendment, the inmate must meet two requirements: (1) the 
deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious,” 
and (2) the “prison official must have a sufficiently culpable 
state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The first 
element is satisfied when an inmate is deprived of “the minimal 
civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 
U.S. 294, 299 (1991). The second element is satisfied when an 
inmate shows that prison officials acted with deliberate 
indifference to the inmate’s health or safety or conditions of 
confinement that violated the inmate’s constitutional rights. Id. 
at 302–03. 
 
In light of Farmer, we adopted a subjective knowledge 
standard to establish deliberate indifference, requiring a 
showing that prison officials actually knew of and disregarded 
constitutional violations. Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 
120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001). This tracks the general standard for 
liability, which requires a showing that each defendant was 
personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing. Evancho v. 
Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). “Personal 
involvement can be shown through allegations of personal 
direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Id. And a 
defendant’s knowledge of a risk to health and safety “can be 
proved indirectly by circumstantial evidence to the effect that 
the excessive risk was so obvious that the official must have 
known of the risk.” Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
 
When considering whether conditions of confinement 
violated the Eighth Amendment, we recognize that “the 
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and 
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prisons … which house persons convicted of serious crimes, 
cannot be free of discomfort.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 
337, 349 (1981). “To the extent that such conditions are 
restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that 
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Id. 
at 347. Indeed, even though administrative confinement in a 
dry cell is unpleasant and often unsanitary, so long as the 
conditions of that confinement are not foul or inhuman, and are 
supported by some penological justification, they will not 
violate the Eighth Amendment. Young, 960 F.2d at 364. 
 
Thomas’s complaint makes two challenges to his 
confinement in the dry cell. First, he complains of specific 
deprivations he allegedly suffered during his confinement. 
Second, he challenges the duration of that confinement. In its 
order granting summary judgment, the District Court 
addressed Thomas’s challenge to the specific deprivations he 
allegedly suffered during his confinement. It determined that, 
even if the specific deprivations allegedly suffered by Thomas 
violated his Eighth Amendment rights, the PRC members 
could not be held liable because there was no evidence that 
they were personally involved in those deprivations. Thomas, 
2018 WL 1251831, at *5. Because the evidence did not provide 
a sufficient basis upon which a reasonable jury could conclude 
that the individual defendants had knowledge of Thomas’s 
conditions of confinement, including whether he was 
improperly shackled, we agree with the District Court that his 
condition of confinement claim against these defendants fails.3 
 
But the duration of Thomas’s confinement in the dry 
cell is a separate issue. Young, 960 F.2d at 364 (“The duration 
and conditions of segregated confinement cannot be ignored in 
deciding whether such confinement meets constitutional 
standards.” (citation omitted)). The PRC had the authority to 
                                              
3 The District Court also concluded that, even if the 
members of the PRC had been personally involved in the 
alleged deprivations, they would still be entitled to qualified 
immunity. Thomas, 2018 WL 1251831, at *6–7. Because we 
agree with the District Court’s analysis on personal 
involvement in the alleged violations, we do not address this 
alternative ground for the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment. 
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end Thomas’s administrative confinement in the dry cell and 
return him to the general population, so PRC members were 
personally involved in determining the duration of Thomas’s 
confinement in the dry cell. The District Court did not address 
this secondary claim in its summary judgment order. We will 
do so now.  
 
As noted above, administrative confinement in a dry 
cell must serve some penological interest. See Young, 960 F.2d 
at 364. Thomas was originally placed in the dry cell after a 
guard in the visitation room saw Thomas ingest what the guard 
suspected may have been contraband. The guard watched 
Thomas’s visitor fidget with something and then offer it to 
Thomas, which he swallowed with a drink of soda. Thomas 
explained that the “something” he ate was merely a peanut 
M&M. But Prison officials assert that hiding drugs in small, 
multi-colored balloons in bags of peanut M&Ms has become a 
popular method for introducing contraband into prisons. So the 
PRC reasonably argues that, under these circumstances, the 
guard’s suspicion that Thomas had ingested contraband was 
reasonable and warranted Thomas’s initial placement in the 
dry cell.  
 
Thomas argues that this initial suspicion was dispelled 
by the time the members of the PRC interviewed him four days 
later, and they knew that there was no longer a penological 
justification for his continued confinement. Thomas’s claim is 
supported by the undisputed evidence. During the first four 
days of his confinement, with the aid of laxatives, Thomas had 
twelve bowl movements. His stool was carefully examined 
after each bowl movement, and no evidence of contraband was 
found. Thomas also submitted to an x-ray of his abdominal 
cavity. The x-ray technician informed Thomas that his x-ray 
was clean; the only thing inside of him was a bullet near his 
spine. And although the x-ray report identified a foreign object 
in the region,4 it also noted, crucially, that there was no 
obstruction in Thomas’s gastrointestinal tract. During the 
administrative appeal, Deputy Garman explained: “Dry cell 
placement was done in good faith after staff reasonably 
believed [Thomas] had ingested contraband. Policy and 
                                              
4 Presumably, this foreign object would have been the 
bullet. 
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procedures were followed. However, once the x-ray failed to 
reveal any obstruction, and several bowel movements 
occurred, [Thomas] should have been released sooner.” J.A. 
314. 
 
After the initial interview with an inmate in 
administrative confinement, prison regulations require the 
PRC to decide whether to end or continue the administrative 
confinement and to set forth its reason for that decision. See 
DC-ADM 802 § 2.A. Following its June 4, 2015 meeting with 
Thomas, the PRC decided to continue his administrative 
confinement, and signed the appropriate forms, but it provided 
no reason for that decision. In their depositions, members of 
the PRC could not explain, or even recall, why they had 
continued Thomas’s confinement. 
 
Now the PRC relies on the affidavit of Security Captain 
Herbert Probst to provide a reason for Thomas’s continued 
confinement in the dry cell. Probst asserts that he was advised 
by the medical department that Thomas’s x-ray revealed an 
unspecified foreign body, which Probst believed warranted 
continued placement in administrative custody. But Probst was 
not a member of the PRC, and there is no evidence that he 
discussed with the PRC Thomas’s continued confinement in 
the dry cell.  
 
The PRC notes that, under prison regulations, it was 
required to confer with the security officer and consider his 
recommendations. Appellees thus ask us to infer that (1) they 
conferred with the security captain, (2) he recommended 
continued confinement based on secondhand information from 
the medical department (despite the negative x-rays and twelve 
samples of contraband-free stool), and (3) the PRC deferred to 
his recommendations. We cannot do this. First, our standard of 
review requires us to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the nonmovant, and PRC is the movant here. See Anderson, 
477 U.S. at 255. Second, the evidence before us shows that the 
PRC failed to follow prison regulations by, for example, failing 
to record any reason for its decision to continue Thomas’s 
confinement in the dry cell. It would be unreasonable to infer 
that the PRC strictly adhered to some regulations, such as 
conferring with the security officer, when it admittedly failed 
to follow others. 
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We conclude that whether there was a penological 
justification to continue Thomas’s administrative confinement 
in the dry cell after June 4, 2015 constitutes a disputed issue of 
material fact. Summary judgment was therefore inappropriate 
on the duration issue. 
 
IV 
 
The PRC members also argue that, even if Thomas’s 
continued confinement without penological justification 
violated his rights, they would still be entitled to qualified 
immunity. On the record before us, we must disagree.  
 
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from 
civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or 
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of 
the challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 
664 (2012) (citation omitted). “To be clearly established, a 
right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official 
would have understood that what he is doing violates that 
right.” Id. (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks 
omitted). To prevail against a claim of qualified immunity, the 
plaintiff need not produce “a case directly on point, but existing 
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional 
question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 
741 (2011) (citation omitted).  
 
Our precedent makes clear that, without some 
penological justification, an inmate may not be 
administratively confined in a dry cell. See Young, 960 F.2d 
351, 364–65; cf. United States v. Holloway, 128 F.3d 1254, 
1256 (8th Cir. 1997) (dry cell justified when prison officials 
had reason to believe inmate was smuggling contraband into 
jail). See also Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347 (conditions of 
confinement may not be “grossly disproportionate” or “result 
in pain without any penological purpose”); Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (“[T]he sanction imposed cannot be 
so totally without penological justification that it results in the 
gratuitous infliction of suffering.”). 
 
While the penological purpose must always be 
legitimate, Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 475, 476 (3d Cir. 
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2018), we have never determined the exact quantum or nature 
of penological interest that is needed to justify confinement in 
a dry cell. But we are satisfied that there must be at least some 
interest. Here, the PRC failed to present evidence of any 
continuing penological interest after its initial interview with 
Thomas. Without such a penological justification for Thomas’s 
continued confinement in the dry cell, the PRC members are 
not entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
V 
 
Our dissenting colleague would go farther and reverse 
the District Court on Thomas’s conditions-of-confinement 
claim as well as the duration claim. While acknowledging the 
severity of dry cells generally and Thomas’s particularly trying 
experience, we decline that approach. It is undisputed that the 
PRC members were not responsible for Thomas’s conditions 
of confinement. J.A. 194–95. Nor is there any record evidence 
that they actually knew about his alleged deprivations. 
Thomas’s cell door had a window, but the record does not 
disclose what was visible through the window or whether PRC 
members actually saw Thomas’s deprivations.5 And while 
Thomas “yell[ed]” at the PRC as they left his cell, it was not to 
itemize his various grievances; he was trying to explain the 
circumstances that led to his placement in the dry cell. J.A. 
175–76. Thomas specifically admitted that he never spoke to 
the PRC about any of his requests for hygienic materials, 
explaining that his goal “wasn’t to stay there and wash my 
hands there,” but rather “to get out of there.” J.A. 179. So on a 
second visit, Thomas again failed to inform the PRC of his 
alleged deprivations. J.A. 179. 
                                              
 5 For example, toilet paper and sanitizing wipes are 
provided to the inmate after he uses the bed pan or urine bottle. 
So the PRC members would not have known of this alleged 
deprivation merely by visual inspection. Nor would they have 
known by peering into the cell that Thomas’s smock had not 
been exchanged for a new one; and he did not tell them. 
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The dissent relies heavily on our opinion in Young v. 
Martin, 801 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2015).6 In addition to being 
factually distinguishable, Martin was an excessive-force case 
decided under the applicable knew-or-should-have-known 
standard that was rejected for condition-of-confinement cases 
in Farmer. “[A] prison official cannot be found liable under 
the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane 
conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and 
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the 
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference 
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 
and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 
Even granting arguendo the many inferences that our 
dissenting colleague would draw in Thomas’s favor, there is 
simply no evidence in this record that the PRC members 
appreciated the same facts and drew the same inferences.7 
                                              
 6 The dissent also relies on Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 
(2002). Hope was an excessive force case, and we have since 
recognized that the Eighth Amendment test for claims related 
to use of excessive force by mechanical restraints on prisoners 
described in Hope differs from the Farmer test for claims 
related to conditions of confinement. Young v. Martin, 801 
F.3d 172, 179–80 (3d Cir. 2015). While the Hope “Court 
referred to Farmer briefly … its analysis of whether the use of 
mechanical restraints violated the Eighth Amendment 
indisputably began and ended in terms drawn from its 
excessive force jurisprudence.” Id. at 179. We have not held 
that mechanical restraints cannot be considered in a conditions-
of-confinement case; indeed, the improper use of mechanical 
restraints may be considered in a conditions-of-confinement 
case. But reliance on Hope here is inapposite.  
 
 7 In Mammana v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 
368 (3d Cir. 2019), we recently held, on a motion to dismiss, 
the plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to assert a viable Eighth 
Amendment violation. This appeal from a grant of summary 
judgment is distinguishable because unlike Mammana, where 
we were required to assume the truth of the plaintiff-
appellant’s factual allegations, here we scoured the evidentiary 
record and determined there is no evidence in the record 
allowing us to conclude the PRC participated in, or had actual 
knowledge of, Thomas’s conditions of confinement. 
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VI 
 
We recognize the importance of administrative 
confinement in dry cells in preventing the smuggling of 
contraband into prisons and protecting both inmates and prison 
staff. So we reiterate that when administrative confinement in 
a dry cell is not foul or inhuman, and serves a legitimate 
penological interest, it will not violate the Eighth Amendment. 
But here the PRC has not presented evidence of any 
penological justification for Thomas’s continued confinement 
in the dry cell. So we will affirm in part and reverse in part the 
District Court’s order granting summary judgment to the 
members of the PRC and remand for further proceedings on 
Thomas’s claim that his continued confinement in the dry cell 
without penological justification violated his constitutional 
rights. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge, concurring in part, 
dissenting in part. 
 Those who violate our laws forfeit the opportunity to 
create or control the conditions under which they live.  
However, our civilized society mandates that these conditions 
be humane and consonant with the Eighth Amendment.  Here, 
the conditions of confinement in Thomas’s dry cell were 
deplorable, to say the very least, and far more egregious than 
any set of circumstances to which we or the Supreme Court 
have lent our imprimatur.  As such, while I concur with my 
colleagues on Thomas’s duration claim, I am compelled to 
dissent from the Majority’s holding on Thomas’s conditions-
of-confinement claim.  
I. THOMAS SUFFERED UNDER INHUMANE 
CONDITIONS IN THE DRY CELL 
 Whether considered individually or on their own—and 
certainly in combination—the conditions Thomas suffered 
while in the dry cell deprived him of “the minimal civilized 
measure of life’s necessities,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 
337, 347 (1981).  I only mention some of these awful 
conditions here.  
 While in the dry cell, Thomas was only allowed to wear 
a paper-thin smock, which did not fit him.  The smock was not 
replaced for a clean one for the duration of his time in the dry 
cell (over nine days).  Despite repeated requests, and in 
violation of prison policies, he was repeatedly denied a blanket.  
As a result, he felt cold throughout his stay in the dry cell.  His 
mattress was soiled and did not have a slip covering, sheet, or 
pillow.   
2 
 
 The entire nine days that Thomas was in the dry cell, a 
light on the wall shined on him.  Not only was he subject to 
constant illumination,1 but he was also continuously 
handcuffed in a painful position.  In particular, his right hand 
was tightly handcuffed to the metal frame of the bed in a 
manner that prevented him from even standing and required 
him to sleep with his right arm outstretched above his head.  
Although he was given brief periods of respite, his right arm 
pained him at length, both during and after his dry-cell stay.      
 Most egregiously, Thomas was repeatedly denied any 
means of cleaning himself, including after bowel movements 
and before meals.  Despite his requests, and in violation of 
prison policies, he was never provided toilet paper, sanitizing 
wipes, or the opportunity to even wash his hands.  Provided 
with the uncontested description of such squalor, we are 
reminded of the realism of both Dickens and Sinclair but no 
tale of fiction is this.  Can we seriously dispassionately 
determine that a prisoner laying in filth and excrement deserves 
our judicial sanction?  We should be pushed over the precipice 
when we note that these conditions forced Thomas to violate 
his religious obligations as a Muslim to cleanse himself before 
his daily prayers.   
                                              
1 We recently recognized that “bright, constant illumination 
that causes ‘grave sleeping problems and other mental and 
psychological problems’ can establish an Eighth Amendment 
deprivation.” Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 
368, 374 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 
1090-91 (9th Cir. 1996)).  
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II. THOMAS’S CONDITIONS CLAIM MUST 
PROCEED TO A JURY 
 Despite these inhumane conditions, the Majority 
entirely relieves Defendants2 of any possible liability by 
perfunctorily affirming the District Court’s determination that 
they were not personally involved.  But, at this summary 
judgment stage, that cannot be said as a matter of law.  Further, 
qualified immunity should not be extended as a safe haven 
under these facts.  Thomas’s conditions claim should proceed 
to a jury.   
A. There Exists a Genuine Dispute of Material Fact as to 
What Defendants Actually Knew 
 As the Majority notes, our precedent reveals that 
personal involvement can be shown through “actual 
knowledge and acquiescence.”  E.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).  Here, 
since Defendants undoubtedly acquiesced through inaction, the 
only question is whether they actually knew about the 
conditions.  This summary judgment record certainly 
demonstrates that a reasonable jury could indeed conclude 
such for three independent reasons.   
 First, Defendants conducted the PRC hearing outside 
Thomas’s dry cell on the fourth day of his confinement there.  
Although we do not know exactly what their view into the dry 
cell was, we know enough to conclude that there is a factual 
                                              
2 I refer to Appellees Eric Tice, Mark Garman, Timothy Miller, 
and Heather Halderman collectively as “Defendants” 
throughout this opinion.  
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dispute about what Defendants saw.  In particular, it is 
undisputed that the hearing was conducted immediately 
outside the dry cell, Appellees’ Br. 14 (stating that the hearing 
was held “at his [dry] cell door”); that the door to the dry cell 
had a window through which prison officials on the outside 
could see Thomas, id. at 122–23 (indicating that “[t]here was 
[a] window” into the dry cell through which a “guard . . . 
watch[ed Thomas]” all day and night), 136 (noting that, “on 
the door” to Thomas’s dry cell, “[t]here was a window [and] a 
slot”); and that Defendants were close enough to the dry cell to 
listen to Thomas’s oral complaints, id. at 201 (documenting 
that Thomas participated in the hearing orally).   
 This evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to 
conclude that Defendants personally viewed, and thus knew, at 
least some of the conditions about which Thomas complains—
his being handcuffed in a painful position; lacking a blanket, 
toilet paper, and sanitizing wipes; and being subject to artificial 
illumination.  Indeed, we must hold so since, as the Majority 
also notes, we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
Thomas, the nonmovant.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 
U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of 
Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 643 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 Second, Thomas suggests that he discussed the 
conditions of his dry cell with Defendants at the PRC hearing.  
In fact, when asked during his deposition whether Halderman 
and other Defendants gave him a chance to tell them his “side 
of things” during the hearing, Thomas stated: “if [Halderman] 
heard me yelling, then she got it.  I was still trying to yell so 
she could hear me as [Defendants] continued to walk on.”  
App. 175–76.  This statement can be reasonably interpreted to 
mean that Thomas informed Defendants about the deplorable 
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conditions in his dry cell—and they thus had actual knowledge 
about the conditions.   
 To be sure, Defendants contend that Thomas never 
complained about his confinement conditions to them.  Of 
course, we do not have authoritative evidence as to what 
Thomas told Defendants chiefly because, contrary to prison 
policies, Defendants did not write a summary of Thomas’s oral 
statements and, as far as the Court is aware, apparently failed 
to take notes of any kind during the hearing.  See App. 39.  
Nonetheless, in support of their position, Defendants point to 
deposition testimony where Thomas was asked whether, when 
he saw Defendants on an unspecified date, he spoke “to any of 
them about [his] request . . . to wash [his] hands or for a shower 
[or] for soap.”  Id. at 179.  Thomas responded in the negative.  
See id.   
 But this sole statement, inquiring only about some of his 
complaints, does not preclude a determination that Defendants 
were personally involved in the many indecent conditions of 
Thomas’s dry cell.  Even if Thomas did not tell Defendants 
about his requests to wash his hands, for a shower, or for soap, 
he still could have told—and generally indicates he did tell—
them about the other grievous conditions he was 
experiencing—including his pain resulting from being 
continuously handcuffed, cold from lacking a blanket and 
wearing a smock too small, unsanitary state from being denied 
toilet paper and sanitizing wipes, and lack of sleep from being 
constantly illuminated.  At a minimum, drawing all inferences 
in Thomas’s favor, we are compelled by our jurisprudence to 
determine that there exists a genuine dispute as to many 
material facts regarding what exactly Thomas told Defendants 
and the knowledge that may reasonably be imputed to them.  
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On its own, that precludes summary judgment on Thomas’s 
conditions claim.     
 Put simply, we cannot say as a matter of law that 
Defendants did not have personal knowledge of, and thus were 
not personally involved in, the conditions of Thomas’s 
confinement in the dry cell.  Especially since we must make all 
reasonable inferences in Thomas’s favor, this factual dispute 
precludes summary judgment.3  In entirely overlooking these 
facts, the Majority makes a glaring error.  
B. Defendants Are Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity 
 Upon summarily affirming the District Court’s personal 
involvement analysis, the Majority explicitly declines to 
determine whether Defendants are entitled to qualified 
immunity on Thomas’s conditions claim.  But because, as 
                                              
3 This conclusion accords with our precedent, as we have 
previously recognized that a party’s state of mind is “typically 
not a proper issue for resolution on summary judgment,” 
Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.3d 351, 360 (n.21) (quoting Wilson v. 
Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 866 (6th Cir. 1990), vacated on other 
grounds, 501 U.S. 294 (1991)), because it is “inherently a 
question of fact which turns on credibility.”  Id. (citing Int’l 
Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1265 (5th Cir. 
1991); Miller v. FDIC, 906 F.2d 972, 974 (4th Cir. 1990); Nat’l 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Turtur, 892 F.2d 199, 205 (2d Cir. 1989); 60 
Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1437 (6th Cir. 
1987); 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Civil 2d § 2730 (1983 & 1991 Supp.)), superseded 
by statute on other grounds as stated in Ghana v. Holland, 226 
F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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explained above, we cannot determine as a matter of law that 
Defendants were not personally involved in the conditions of 
Thomas’s dry cell, we must answer this qualified immunity 
question.  In so doing, our precedent demands that we resolve 
this issue in Thomas’s favor.    
 As the Majority notes, qualified immunity does not 
shield a government official where she has “violated a statutory 
or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time 
of the challenged conduct.”  Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 
664 (2012) (citations omitted).  As I view it, precedent from 
our Court and the Supreme Court clearly establishes that the 
conditions Thomas faced in the dry cell taken together violate 
the Eighth Amendment.  See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347 
(indicating that conditions of confinement, “alone, or in 
combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized 
measure of life’s necessities”).   
 Most directly applicable is our decision in Young v. 
Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1992).  There, Kenneth Young, 
a federal inmate, was placed in a dry cell like Thomas’s for 96 
hours.  See id. at 355.  During this confinement, Young was not 
allowed to wash his hands before eating nor provided with 
toilet paper upon defecating.  See id.  Moreover, during the first 
29 hours of his confinement in the dry cell, Young was denied 
permission to leave the dry cell to urinate or defecate and thus 
relieved himself in a corner of his cell.  See id.   
 After the lower court granted summary judgment for the 
defendant prison officials, we reversed.  See id. at 353.  In 
relevant part, we held that the totality of conditions in the 
inmate’s confinement in the dry cell violated the Eighth 
Amendment.  See id. at 365.  In particular, we reasoned:    
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[W]e cannot condone dehumanizing treatment 
such as was allegedly given Young by [] prison 
officials once he was confined to the dry cell.  
Riley [v. Jeffes], 777 F.2d[ 143,] 148 [(3d Cir. 
1985)] (where plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts 
which, if proven, would entitle plaintiff to relief 
under the Eighth Amendment, dismissal of 
complaint was inappropriate).  Even if Young 
was properly confined to the dry cell, [prison] 
officials do not have a license to impose 
unconstitutional conditions upon him.  See 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667[] (1977) 
(Eighth Amendment proscribes punishment 
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the 
crime); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1108 
(3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Martorano, 866 
F.2d 62, 69 (3d Cir. 1989). 
When viewed in their totality, the alleged actions 
of [the] prison officials—not allowing Young to 
leave his cell more than once to defecate or 
urinate over a period of several days, not 
providing Young with a plastic urinal for 29 
hours, not allowing Young to empty his urinal 
more than twice, not allowing Young to wash his 
hands before eating, not allowing Young to bathe 
or shower, not providing Young with toilet paper 
despite his diarrhea, not providing Young with 
water to drink, suggesting instead that he drink 
his urine, and the mocking taunts by guards and 
their threats to chain Young to a steel slab if he 
complained about his conditions—would if 
proved demonstrate a violation of the basic 
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concepts of humanity and decency that are at the 
core of the protections afforded by the Eighth 
Amendment.  It would be an abomination of the 
Constitution to force a prisoner to live in his own 
excrement for four days in a stench that not even 
a fellow prisoner could stand.  
The conditions that Young was allegedly made 
to endure for four days are all the more revolting 
considering that Young is HIV positive, and, 
hence, more susceptible to infection and disease.  
See Tillery [v. Owens], 907 F.2d [418,] 428 [(3d 
Cir. 1990)].  Such a denial of even basic 
sanitation in our opinion is “cruel and unusual 
because, in the worst case, it can result in 
physical torture, and, even in less serious cases, 
it can result in pain without any penological 
purpose[.]”  Estelle [v. Gamble], 429 U.S. [97,] 
103 [(1976)].  We find that Young has 
sufficiently alleged that the actions of certain [] 
prison officials “resulted in unquestioned and 
serious deprivation of basic human needs,” 
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347[], and as such, Young 
has satisfied the objective component of a claim 
for violations of the Eighth Amendment. 
Young, 960 F.2d at 364-65.  
 Young thus clearly established in 1992 that an inmate’s 
extended confinement in a dry cell where she, among other 
things, cannot wash her hands before eating, use toilet paper 
after defecating, bathe, or shower violates the Eighth 
Amendment.  This principle is directly applicable here: the 
conditions of Thomas’s confinement violated clearly 
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established Eighth Amendment law given their similarity to the 
conditions of Young’s confinement.4  
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 
U.S. 730 (2002), further tips the scale in Thomas’s favor.  
There, Larry Hope, a state inmate, fell asleep during a 
“morning bus ride to [his] chain gang’s worksite.”  Id. at 734.  
Consequently, he “was less than prompt in responding to an 
order to get off the bus” and eventually got into a “wrestling 
match with a guard.”  Id.  As a result, Hope was handcuffed, 
placed in leg irons, and transported back to the prison where he 
was cuffed on a “hitching post.”  Id.  “The guards made him 
take off his shirt, and he remained shirtless all day while the 
sun burned his skin.”  Id. at 734–35.  He was chained to the 
post for seven hours and was given water only once, denied 
bathroom breaks, and taunted by the guards.  See id. at 735. 
                                              
4 Defendants seek to elude the inevitable grasp of Young’s 
reach by highlighting that Young, unlike Thomas, was HIV 
positive and thus had a heightened risk of infection from being 
in proximity to his bowel movements.  But Young’s HIV status 
was but one aspect we considered in that case—and that, too, 
after we already deemed that the totality of the other conditions 
of his confinement constituted an Eighth Amendment 
violation.  960 F.2d at 365.  Using Defendants’ logic, no Eighth 
Amendment violation would ever be clearly established given 
the inevitable factual novelties in the real-world scenarios that 
come before the courts.  For this reason, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that “officials can still be on notice that their 
conduct violates established law even in,” as here, “novel 
factual circumstances.”  Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 
(2002).  If anything, this case presents such a circumstance. 
11 
 
 On these facts, the Supreme Court concluded that an 
“Eighth Amendment violation is obvious.”  Id. at 737–38 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The Supreme 
Court explained: 
[T]he respondents knowingly subjected [Hope] 
to a substantial risk of physical harm, to 
unnecessary pain caused by the handcuffs and 
the restricted position of confinement for a 
[seven]–hour period, to unnecessary exposure to 
the heat of the sun, to prolonged thirst and 
taunting, and to a deprivation of bathroom breaks 
that created a risk of particular discomfort and 
humiliation.  The use of the hitching post under 
these circumstances violated the “basic concept 
underlying the Eighth Amendment[, which] is 
nothing less than the dignity of man.”  Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100[] (1958).  This punitive 
treatment amounts to gratuitous infliction of 
“wanton and unnecessary” pain that our 
precedent clearly prohibits. 
Hope, 536 U.S. at 738 (footnote omitted). 
 Hope therefore clearly established in 2002 that extended 
and painful handcuffing of an inmate violates the Eighth 
Amendment.  That is precisely what Thomas endured here, 
where his right hand was painfully handcuffed throughout his 
nine days in the dry cell, save for occasional and fleeting 
periods of respite.5  
                                              
5 As with Young, Defendants attempt to undermine Hope’s 
applicability by asserting that Hope was handcuffed outdoors 
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 Finally, our recent decision in Mammana v. Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368 (3d Cir. 2019), further 
demonstrates that Defendants cannot avail themselves of 
qualified immunity.  There, Anthony Mammana, a federal 
inmate, alleged that he was “deprived of his clothing, provided 
only ‘paper like’ coverings instead, denied bedding [and toilet 
paper], and exposed to low cell temperatures and constant 
bright lighting for four days.”  Id. at 374.  We held that the 
conditions under which Mammana suffered—many of which 
are identical to those Thomas endured here—violated the 
Eighth Amendment.  See id. at 372–73.  Although Mammana 
postdates the events giving rise to this appeal, it relies on an 
array of cases decided well before the instant case.  See id. at 
372 (citing, inter alia, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 
(1991)). 
 In short, then, qualified immunity does not shield 
Defendants from Thomas’s conditions claim.  Among others, 
Young, Hope, and the cases on which Mammana relies clearly 
established before Thomas’s confinement in the dry cell that 
the conditions he suffered there taken together violate the 
Eighth Amendment.  Hence, Thomas’s conditions claim must 
proceed to a jury.   
III. THE LAW MANDATES A FULL REVERSAL 
 “The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment 
is nothing less than the dignity of man.”  Trop v. Dulles, 356 
                                              
in the sun whereas Thomas was not.  But, as Hope itself 
explains at length, the key question in the qualified immunity 
arena is whether the law gives a defendant fair warning that 
her actions are unconstitutional.  See Hope, 536 U.S. at 741.  
Here, Defendants had such fair warning.    
13 
 
U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion).  Here, Thomas was 
housed in a dry cell in utterly undignified conditions.  On that, 
the record is clear.  As to whether Defendants were personally 
involved in these conditions, the record reveals a genuine 
dispute of material facts that precludes summary judgment.  
Qualified immunity, moreover, is of no aid to Defendants 
given the ample precedent deeming similar conditions as 
violative of the Eighth Amendment.  I would vacate in full the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment and remand to the 
District Court for trial on both Thomas’s duration and 
conditions claims.  Given my divergence of viewpoint, I 
dissent from the Majority’s disposition of Thomas’s conditions 
claim.   
